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Preemption and Products Liability: A Positive
Theory
Keith N. Hylton*

In a large number of products liabilitylawsuits, sellers assert
thatplaintiffs' claims should be rejected because theirproducts fall under some federal regulatoryregime, and that the
regulatorystatute takes precedence over or "preempts"state
tort law. This paper is an attempt to set out a positive theory
of the doctrine on preemption of products liabilityclaims.
The federal case law is largely consistent with an approach
that seeks to minimize the costs of erroneousdecisions to
preempt tort lawsuits. In particular,two factors explain many
of the outcomes of the preemption cases in federal courts:
agency independence and the degree of congruence between
the regulatoryand common law standards.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In a large number of products liability lawsuits, sellers assert that
plaintiffs' tort claims should be rejected because their products fall
under some federal regulatory regime, and that the regulatory statute
takes precedence over or "preempts" state tort law. This paper is an
attempt to set out a positive theory of the doctrine on preemption of
products liability claims.
The case law on products liability preemption is full of references
to legislative intent. These references suggest that if one were to read
the preemption provisions of the statutes, one could predict which
*Boston University School of Law, knhylton@bu.edu. Earlier drafts were presented
at the University of Illinois, and Boston University. I thank Jack Beermann, Nancy
Moore, Cathy Sharkey, Ingo Vogelsang, and David Walker for helpful comments on
earlier drafts. I also thank Fei Deng, Jessica Selb, Shafaq Islam, and Yulia Rodionova
for research assistance.
© 2008 by the University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0-226-64596-7/2008/0016-0008$10.00
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tort claims would be preempted and which would not. But anyone
who takes the time to read the statutes and case outcomes would be
disabused of this notion. The preemption provisions in the statutes
are ambiguous. The different case outcomes are difficult to reconcile
on the basis of the statutory language.
To be sure, the legislative intent approach has faded somewhat. It
reached a high point with the Supreme Court's decision in Cipollone
v. Liggett Group, Inc.' Recent Court decisions have moved toward
an "implied preemption" approach that looks for actual conflicts
between common law and federal regulations. Preemption doctrine
is in many respects unsettled. Still, the references to legislative
intent remain in much of the established case law and in many new
decisions.
My aim is to show that preemption doctrine can be explained
largely by objective factors that do not require the divining of Congress's intent. The federal case law is largely consistent with an
approach that seeks to minimize the costs of erroneous decisions to
preempt tort lawsuits. In particular, two factors explain many of the
outcomes of the preemption cases: the degree of congruence between
the regulatoryand common law standardsand the perceived degree
of agency independence.
After setting out an "error cost" model, and using it to explain
federal preemption case law, I conduct an empirical analysis using
samples of federal and state preemption cases. The empirical analysis
can be viewed as preliminary, or as a more rigorous version of the argument based on case law, because there is a possible sample-selection
bias that my sample (court opinions) will not permit me to correct.
Still, results from the federal case sample are quite consistent with
my arguments based on the case law and the predictions of the model.
The probability of preemption increases with the degree of congruence between the regulatory and common law standard, and agency
review processes that are perceived to be independent and rigorous
result in higher rates of preemption. The state case sample does not
fit the model as well, in part because of sparseness of the sample, and
in part because the state courts appear to have a less deferential, or
more interventionist, approach to preemption cases.
Although this paper's focus is on preemption law, a closely related
literature examines the optimal combination of regulation and
litigation as law enforcement mechanisms. 2 Since a decision by a
court to preempt litigation leaves regulation as the sole enforcement
ICipollone v Liggett Group, Inc, 505 US 504 (1992).
2
See Steven Shavell, A Model of the Optimal Use of Liability and Safety Regulation, 15 Rand J Econ 271-80 (1984); Steven Shavell, Liabilityfor Harm Versus Regula-

Keith N. Hylton

207

mechanism, studying optimal preemption is equivalent to studying
the optimal combination of regulation and litigation. However, this
paper differs from the previous economic literature in several ways:
by examining a particular area of law, products liability; by offering
a positive theory of the case law on preemption, and by conducting
an empirical test of the theory using preemption case outcomes in
federal and state courts.
II.

LAW AND LITERATURE: AN OVERVIEW

Preemption of products liability claims is still a young and rapidly
developing area of the law, which should not surprise anyone given
that products liability itself began, more or less, in the late 1960s
with the publication of Section 402A of the Second Restatement of
Torts. Indeed, the first federal court opinion to focus on the preemption question in products liability appears to be Wood v. General
Motors,3 decided in 1988.1
Under standard preemption analysis courts examine express and
implied preemption. Express preemption occurs when the federal
statute at issue says clearly that it preempts state law tort claims.
Under the Constitution's Supremacy clause, courts are bound to
follow a federal statute's unambiguous instruction to preempt state
law. Implied preemption, in contrast, occurs in the absence of clear
preemption instructions and takes two forms: field and conflict preemption. The former is said to occur when federal regulation is so
extensive that it leaves virtually no room for the states to regulate.
The latter is said to occur when there is a conflict between federal
and state law, such that it would be virtually impossible to comply
with both.
Congress seldom speaks clearly with respect to preemption. As a
consequence, few if any federal regulatory statutes express an unambiguous legislative intent to preempt state tort law. The case law
seldom found express preemption of tort claims until the Supreme
tion of Safety, 13 J Legal Stud 357-74 (1984); Edward L. Gleaser and Andrei Shleifer,
The Rise of the Regulatory State, 41 J Econ Lit 401-25 (2003); Chenggang Xu and Katherina Pistor, Law Enforcement under Incomplete Law: Theory and Evidence from
FinancialMarket Regulation, Columbia Law School Working Paper No. 222, online
at http://ssrn.com/abstract-id=396141 (visited Oct 21, 2007).
3
Wood v GeneralMotors, 865 F2d 395 (1 st Cir 1988).
4Another early substantial treatment appears in Abner Mikva's opinion in Ferebee
v Chevron Chem Co, 736 F2d 1529 (DC Cir 1984), a Federal Insecticide Fungicide and
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) case. There are several cases predating Wood and Ferebee that
touch on the preemption issue, but only tangentially and without focus. Many of these
cases are included in the sample used in the empirical section of this paper.
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Court's decision in Cipollone, which dramatically altered the doctrine.' In Cipollone,the Court found that the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act expressly preempted state law failure to warn
claims based on inadequate cigarette labeling. The relevant portion
of the statute, section 5(b), said:
No requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health
shall be imposed under State law with respect to the advertising
or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which
are labeled
6
in conformity with the provisions of this Act.

The Supreme Court concluded that this provision "sweeps broadly,"7
preempting both state statutory and common law rules.
Cipolloneturned preemption doctrine on its head, though only for
a brief period. Before 1992 (the date of Cipollone)courts talked largely
in terms of implied preemption, since no court could safely conclude,
on the basis of the language typically found in a federal statute, that
Congress intended to bar private tort suits. Immediately after Cipollone, courts began finding evidence of legislative intent to preempt in
language that was considered to "sweep broadly," like the language
of the statute in Cipollone. For example, in King v. E.I. Dupont De
Nemours & Co.,' the First Circuit read the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) to preempt failure to warn claims
based on language in the statute that seemed similar to the language
of the preemption provision in Cipollone. Some scholars argued that
express preemption had become the dominant mode of analysis, and
implied preemption theories had been abandoned.9
The Cipollone period came to an end in 1996 with the Supreme
Court's decision in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr. 10 In Lohr, the Court
stared at a preemption provision that looked very much like the one
in Cipollone and concluded that it did not preempt state tort law. The
plaintiff had brought failure to warn, negligence, and strict liability
claims against Medtronic when her pacemaker failed. The pacemaker
had been approved for marketing by the Food and Drug Administra5
Indeed, before Cipollone, the trend ran largely against finding preemption, under
either an express or implied theory. Many courts held that federal regulatory statutes
provided only minimum standards, which could (and should) be supplemented by
state tort standards.
6
15 USCA § 1334(b).
7
Cipollone, 505 US at 521.
'King v El Dupont De Nemours & Co, 996 F2d 1346 (1st Cir 1993).
9See, for example, Richard A. Epstein, Cases and Materials on Torts 851 (6th ed
1995).
"°Medtronic,Inc v Lohr, 518 US 470 (1996).
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tion under the Medical Devices Amendment Act of 1976. The statute
sets out a two-tiered review scheme for "Class III" medical devices,
such as the pacemaker, which have the greatest impact on life. The
two-tiered review involves either a rigorous pre-market approval process or a designation that the product is substantially equivalent to
a device that was on the market before 1976. If the product meets
the "substantial equivalence" test, it does not have to undergo the
pre-market approval process, and is approved for marketing as long as
it is no more dangerous or less effective than the earlier comparable
device. The plaintiff's pacemaker in Lohr had been approved for marketing under the substantial equivalence test.
Although the preemption provision of Lohr was virtually identical
to that of Cipollone,the Court, which split in three ways, was unanimous in the view that it did not preempt defective design claims. The
plurality offered several lawyerly distinctions between the regulation in Lohr and that in Cipollone.However, the one distinction on
which the whole Court agreed was that the substantial equivalence
test led to no regulatory requirements that could come into conflict
with state tort law.
Since 1996 the lower courts, following Lohr, have returned to a
focus on implied preemption analysis. Under this approach, courts
look for evidence of a potential conflict between federal regulation
and the specific requirements implied by the plaintiff's tort theory.
For example, in Lewis v. Brunswick Corp.," the Eleventh Circuit,
confronting a preemption provision that looked similar to that in
Cipollone, concluded that the plaintiff's negligence and defective
design claims were preempted. This was not because of the language
of the preemption provision. It was because the plaintiff's theory, in
the court's view, would have required the defendant boat maker to
install a safety device-a propeller guard-that the Coast Guard had
decided not to require pursuant to its duty under the Federal Boat
Safety Act.
The Supreme Court appears to have entered an advanced stage
of implied preemption analysis in recent years with its decisions in
Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co.,' 2 Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine,13 and
Bates v. Dow Agrosciences.14 In this new stage, the Court is applying implied preemption analysis in a conservative manner, refusing to find preemption unless there is evidence of a serious conflict
"Lewis v Brunswick Corp, 107 F3d 1494 (11 th Cir 1997).
2
Geier v Am Honda Motor Co, 529 US 861 (2000).
'Sprietsma v Mercury Marine, 537 US 51 (2002).
14Bates v Dow Agrosciences, 544 US 431 (2005).
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between federal regulation and state tort law. In Geier the Court
found such evidence when it looked at the potential conflict between
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208 and the plaintiff's defective design claim based on the defendant car manufacturer's failure
to install an airbag. The Court found that the plaintiff's claim was
preempted because it would have conflicted with the Department
of Transportation's decision to provide compliance options for car
manufacturers.
Sprietsma, on the other hand, found that the plaintiff's demand
for a propeller guard was not preempted by the Federal Boat Safety
Act, the opposite result of the Eleventh Circuit in Lewis. In spite of
the different result, the Court did not reject the implied preemption
approach of Lewis, it simply applied the analysis with greater caution
and skepticism toward broad claims of preemption. After looking
closely at the Coast Guard's analysis of the propeller guard issue,
the Court decided that its refusal to adopt a uniform propeller guard
requirement did not preclude a court from finding that a particular
boat design was defectively dangerous because it failed to include a
propeller guard.
The Court's most recent preemption case, Bates, found that defective design and manufacture claims were not preempted by FIFRA,
and information-based claims (failure to warn and fraud) were preempted only if they required information disclosure that was not
parallel to the requirements of the statute." This is a clear rejection of the approach to FIFRA analysis adopted by some courts-e.g.
King-during the express preemption period.
Many commentators have noted the confusion and uncertainty in
preemption doctrine, and some have urged the enactment of a regulatory compliance defense in order to bring certainty to the law. Viscusi
argues that a regulatory compliance defense would be desirable in
areas in which the federal regulatory scheme provides optimal or
excessive deterrence.16 He offers the drug approval process under the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act as a case study of an area in which a
regulatory compliance defense would be socially desirable. Schwartz
argues that courts (or legislators) should adopt a general (default rule)
regulatory compliance defense because it is more likely that an erroneous decision to set the standard of care too low will be corrected
'Id
at 444-48.
6

' W. Kip Viscusi, Steven R. Rowland, Howard L. Dorfman, and Charles J. Walsh,
The Effect of ProductsLiability Litigation on Innovation:DeterringInefficient Pharmaceutical Litigation: An Economic Rationale for the FDA Regulatory Compliance
Defense, 24 Seton Hall L Rev 1437 (1994).
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by Congress than an erroneous decision to set the standard of care
too high. 7
In the remainder, I will reject both views-i.e., that preemption
doctrine is in a state of confusion and that a regulatory compliance
defense is necessary. The case law is largely defensible on economic
grounds. In addition, some of the cases that seem to be in tension,
such as Geier and Sprietsma, are reconcilable within this paper's
framework. The empirical analysis of preemption cases in this paper
further supports the view that the case law has a rational basis. However, the empirical analysis also supports Viscusi's charge with respect
to the drug approval process under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.
For the period of the sample used below (1971-2002), courts appear
to be unjustifiably reluctant to preempt tort suits involving drugs
approved by the Food and Drug Administration. But this appears to
be a special case rather than an example of a general deficiency in
the courts.
III. THEORY OF PREEMPTION DOCTRINE
A. Error Cost Model
The theoretical issues in preemption analysis are old and were largely
dealt with in Holmes's discussion of the jury in The Common Law.'
Holmes asked whether society should prefer to have the judge or the
jury determine negligence. Holmes presented a model in which the
judge decides whether to give the negligence question to the jury.
He concluded that in order for the law to become more predictable
over time, the judge would have to take an increasingly large share of
negligence determinations under his control. The jury would be consulted, under Holmes's scheme, when the judge did not have enough
experience with similar cases to be able to set the optimal standard
of care on his own. In these cases, the jury would serve as a source
of information on the costs and benefits of requiring additional care,
and on the state of community norms.
One could describe Holmes's model as a choice between two decision processes for choosing the optimal legal standard, both subject
7
Alan Schwartz, Statutory Interpretation,Capture, and Tort Law: The Regulatory
Compliance Defense, 2 Am L & Econ Rev 1 (2000).
"Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 122-27 (Little, Brown 1881).
Though taking a very different approach from this paper, Robert Rabin noticed the
similarity between the agency-court question and the judge-jury problem analyzed by
Holmes. See Robert Rabin, Reassessing Regulatory Compliance, 88 Georgetown L J
2049 (2000).
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to error. The jury has an advantage in terms of its access to local
information and to norms that change over time. The disadvantage of
the jury is that it has a higher error variance than does the judge.
The preemption question can be treated as a slightly more complicated version of the problem of choosing between judge and jury. In
the preemption case, the choice is between letting courts decide the
standard of care in each case or letting an agency determine it once
and for all.
Assume the question is whether a product design should be
deemed "unreasonably dangerous" on the basis of a comparison of
the incremental risk and utility the design offers in comparison to
a safer alternative. As courts have noted, this is similar to a negligence determination. 9 To simplify the analysis, I will assume that
the risk-utility test is the optimal standard, as well as the common
law standard. 0 Should courts determine the appropriate risk-utility
trade off in every individual case, or should an agency determine the
21
risk-utility standard once?
The economic approach to this question compares the sum of
expected error and administrative costs under the two regimes. By
expected error costs, I mean the expected costs of "false convictions"
and of "false acquittals." This requires an assessment of the likelihood of erroneous decisions in favor of the plaintiff or the defendant, and their concomitant costs. The approach I will explain here
is similar in some respects to a model set out by Shavell, 22 but there
are substantial differences and the conclusions differ too.
The administrative costs under the two regimes (courts versus
agency) are easy to compare. Until precedents are set and respected
among the individual courts, the case-by-case system in the courts
19

For example, Volkswagen of Am v Young, 321 A2d 737 (Md 1974).

20For

the argument that the common law of products liability has converged, or is

in the process of converging, on economically optimal legal standards, see William M.
Landes and Richard A. Posner, A PositiveAnalysis of Products Liability, 14 J Legal
Stud 535 (1985). The framework of this paper rejects the notion that a simple strict
liability rule would be appropriate for all types of products liability claim. One reason
is that the causation issues that would be generated by such a rule would make it
unpracticable.
21i do not consider the assumption that agencies use risk-utility analysis as a
restrictive one for this model. If agencies seek optimal results, the risk-utility standard is a desirable approach. If agencies do not seek optimal results, then the argument
for preemption becomes extremely weak and largely uninteresting. In addition, the
risk-utility standard builds in the assumption that both agencies and courts evaluate
the standard on the basis of objective information with respect to risks and potential
harms. This approach rejects the notion that policy preferences drive the implementation22of the risk utility test.
Shavell, 13 J Legal Stud 357 (cited in note 2).

Keith N. Hylton

213

has higher administrative costs, since it involves many determinations of the risk-utility standard rather than one. Thus, a narrow
focus on administrative costs favors the agency regime.13
The error costs under the two regimes are ambiguous a priori.
Setting aside error probabilities for the moment, it is hard to say
whether the actual costs of false acquittals are greater than those of
false convictions in products liability cases. False acquittals mean
that products that are unreasonably dangerous remain on the market,
injuring consumers. False convictions mean that products that are
not unreasonably dangerous are driven from the market by lawsuits,
also harming consumers. Given this ambiguity, I see no need to try
to separate false-conviction and false-acquittal costs in the analysis
below. I will focus on error probabilities.
Consider the error probabilities in products liability litigation.
Three factors determine the likelihood of error. First, the expertise
of the agency is a factor that suggests that errors are less likely under
the agency regime wherever expertise on product risk characteristics
and utility is valuable in setting the optimal (or common law) standard. 24 Second, the jury's superior knowledge of local conditions or
norms is a factor that suggests errors are less likely under the court
regime whenever local knowledge is valuable in setting the right
standard. 25 Third, political distortion is a factor that suggests that
errors are less likely under the court regime, where the risk of such
26
distortion is low.

By political distortion, I refer to the public choice concerns that
enter whenever one takes a question away from the jury and puts it
in the hands of a government agent. Agency officials may come under
the influence of the parties whom they are supposed to regulate. In
instances where the government agency has come under the influence of the regulated firm, the agency's standard may be biased in
favor of the firm.
These three factors-agency expertise, local knowledge, and political distortion-do not exhaust the list of factors that could be
considered in determining the preemption issue. Society has, in addi13Richard C. Ausness, The Casefor a "Strong" Regulatory ComplianceDefense, 55
Md L Rev 1210 (1996). My conclusion (and that of Ausness) differs from that of Shavell,
13 J Legal Stud 357 (cited in note 2), which argues that administrative costs are lower
in the courts.
24
Shavell, 13 J Legal Stud at 369 (cited in note 2),
21Id at 366.
6Shavell's analysis does not take political distortion (or rent seeking) into account.
In addition to this important distinction, there are some features of Shavell's model
that are excluded from this analysis (e.g., the risk of judgment-proof parties) because
they do not improve the model's ability to explain preemption law.
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tion, an interest in providing predictability. A regime that has less
potential to be accurate ex post may be preferable because it is more
predictable ex ante. Consider, for example, the choice between a custom rule and a negligence rule for medical malpractice. However, it
is difficult to say how much ex-post accuracy potential should be sacrificed in order to gain additional predictability. For this reason, I will
rely largely on the three factors identified above. However, the need
for predictability is a tie-breaking factor that leans (like the desire to
minimize administrative costs) in favor of the agency regime.
The three factors identified here suggest no clear general societal
preference for the court or agency regime. Whether tort claims should
be preempted by federal regulation depends on a weighing of these
factors. It is possible, however, to go further and suggest a specific
approach to preemption questions.
A finding of preemption should depend largely on two considerations. First, as a threshold matter, was the agency's determination
independent, in the sense that it was not overly influenced or biased
by some interested party? If a court finds substantial evidence that
the agency did not act independently, then it should not find the
tort claim preempted. The reason is that political influence, if left
unchecked, feeds on itself and grows. If firms know that they can
acquire tort immunity by putting themselves under phony regulatory regimes, they will bid for this type of protection. A firm that
faces a potential tort liability of $5 million would rather invest $4
million in setting up a regulatory regime that provides immunity.
The second consideration is the degree of congruence between
the agency's standard and the standard that would be used by the
court. This consideration encompasses the first two (expertise, local
knowledge) of the three factors (expertise, local knowledge, political
distortion) that influence the overall likelihood of error. Superior
expertise on the part of the agency should lead the court to favor
preemption, provided that the agency's standard is equivalent to that
of the common law (which is assumed to be optimal). In contrast, if
local knowledge is important in applying the common law standard,
the fact that the agency employs a standard different from the common law should be a sufficient basis to deny preemption.
Time lags are important in determining the degree of congruence
between the agency's regulatory standard and the common law standard. Suppose the agency issues a standard in period one, and new
risk information arises in period two indicating that the agency's
standard is suboptimal. Since the common law standard would adapt
to take the new risk information into account, the agency standard
would no longer be congruent if it did not also adapt to reflect the
new information.
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B. Examples and Illustrations
Consider some examples to flesh out this argument. Federal Motor
Vehicle Safety Standard 208, issued by the Department of Transportation, at one time gave car makers options with respect to passive
restraint systems. The agency, from the evidence that has emerged,
appears to be independent, and it appears to base its standard on a
weighing of incremental risks and utility, the same factors that would
be considered under the common law standard in a products liability
action. On the basis of agency expertise, this analysis suggests that
preemption of state law design-defect claims under Standard 208 is
desirable. The state law design-defect claim requires the court to
apply the same test as that applied by the agency in setting its standard. Moreover, the agency has an advantage in terms of expertise. A
rule of preemption minimizes error under these conditions. It avoids
an outcome in which a less expert jury reexamines the methodology
of a more expert agency. However, preemption would be inappropriate under this analysis if the defendant seller did not comply with the
agency's regulations or if the agency's standard is not equivalent to
the common law standard.
As a second example, consider a nuisance claim. Nuisance claims,
as a general rule, require knowledge of local environmental conditions in assessing whether the defendant's conduct constitutes an
"unreasonable invasion. ' 27 In other words, the common law standard for nuisances relies on local information. Given this, there is
no strong basis for a rule favoring preemption of nuisance claims
in a case where a federal agency sets a standard that is claimed by
defendants to preempt nuisance suits. For example, the 1996 Telecommunications Act appears to preempt nuisance suits based on
health concerns related to the siting of cell phone towers. 2 A court,
however, is likely to take additional information into account (e.g.,
nearness of a grade school or hospital, or other emission sources) in
determining whether a cell phone tower should be deemed a nuisance. Under this paper's framework, it would be inefficient, as a
general rule, to preempt nuisance suits under the siting provision of
the 1996 Telecommunications Act.
More generally, we can use this framework to predict where
products liability lawsuits are most likely to be preempted by federal regulation. Products liability lawsuits can be grouped into three
types: manufacturing defect, design defect, and failure to warn.
21See, for example, William L. Prosser, Handbookof The Law of Torts 580-81 (West
4th ed 1971).
IsTelecommunications Act, Pub L No 104-104, § 704, 110 Stat 56 (1996).
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Manufacturing defect claims cover cases in which the plaintiff is
injured because of a glitch in the widget production line. One out
of a thousand widgets is made dangerously defective by this glitch,
and the plaintiff happens to have bought that one in one thousand
defect. These claims are governed by strict liability, which means
that courts forgo any inquiry into the seller's fault. Design defect
claims cover cases in which the plaintiff alleges that the product
is unreasonably dangerous because its risks are too large relative to
its benefits, in comparison to some feasible safer alternative. These
claims are governed by "consumer expectation" and "risk-utility"
tests-and for simplicity I will focus on the risk-utility test. Failure
to warn claims cover cases in which the plaintiff sues on a negligence
theory for the seller's failure to provide notice of the dangerous attributes of a product.
It follows from the foregoing that, of the three products-liability
claim types, manufacturing defect claims should be preempted least
frequently. A federal regulatory agency could not, without incurring an enormous expense, set a standard governing manufacturing
glitches that could be used to preempt tort claims efficiently. Suppose the agency were to preempt all tort claims when the glitches
occurred at a rate of one per thousand or less. In order to enforce this
scheme, the agency would have to monitor the production process of
every regulated entity, which is infeasible. If a manufacturing defect
were to occur, it would be quite difficult for a court to determine
ex post whether the manufacturer had complied with the agency's
standard, unless government agents had monitored the plant so
closely that objective records of failure rates could be brought into
court. It follows, then, that preemption should be infrequent and generally limited to those cases in which government agents regularly
inspect regulated entities.
In contrast, error-cost minimization implies that design defect
and failure to warn claims should be preempted with substantial
frequency, under the appropriate conditions. If an agency has considered the factors that a court would weigh in conducting a riskutility analysis, and concluded that the product is on net beneficial
to consumers, then courts should defer to the agency's decision if it is
reached in an independent manner. However, if the agency is merely
rubber stamping the safety standards developed by the industry,
then it is not acting independently, and the argument for preemption
weakens.
There are different degrees of agency independence. The highest
degree of independence is observed when the agency's staffing, methodology, and data are invulnerable to bias from industry influence.
Perhaps the closest to this ideal is the Food and Drug Administration,
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which is independent with respect to methodology and staff, 29 but
relies on regulated firms to supply data on the effects of new drugs.
Even here, the scientific standards governing drug trials are so high
that we may just as well treat this as a case of independence with
respect to data as well. On the other extreme, one finds the Consumer Product Safety Commission, which at least at one time relied
on industry to design flammable product safety standards. 30 Under
this paper's framework, preemption should be more probable as the
agency's independence increases-and this will lead to differences in
observed preemption rates for design and warning claims.
In addition to evidence of agency independence, the frequency
with which design defect and failure to warn claims will be preempted should be a function of the degree of congruence between the
regulatory and common law standards. Congruence is almost always
satisfied in the case in which the agency determines its standard by
weighing risks and benefits for every individual product type. For example, if (as is not the case) the Department of Transportation evaluated the risks and benefits of every car design, then each regulatory
standard governing each car would be determined by a standard that
is congruent with the common law standard. On the other hand,
where an agency issues a generic standard that covers all product
types, congruence will be satisfied only if the risk-benefit calculus is
also generic across product types.
The congruence factor implies that the frequency of preemption
should be greater in failure to warn cases than in design defect cases.
Risk information issues are often generic across product classes. For
example, a warning on the importance of wearing a seat belt should
not depend greatly on the design of the car; similarly, a warning governing the risks of smoking cigarettes should not need to vary greatly
depending on the type of cigarette-at least for most cigarettes commonly marketed. Questions of safety in design, in contrast, are often
highly dependent on the type of product. It is less likely, in com"gThe FDA forms advisory committees to solicit the opinions of expert scientists
and physicians on the safety and efficacy of drugs and medical devices. To encourage the committees' independence, the FDA recruits members from a broad range
of qualified candidates. See, for example, Dixie Farley, Getting Outside Advice for
'Close Calls,' online at http://www.fda.gov/fdac/special/newdrug/advice.html (visited Oct 21, 2007). However, since advisory committees consist almost entirely of
pharmaceutical industry consultants and researchers, some have argued that there is
considerable scope for the pharmaceutical industry to influence the drug approval process. See, for example, Dennis Cauchon, FDA Advisers Tied to Industry, USA Today
10A (Sept 25, 2000). On the other hand, interested parties are the ones most likely to
be the best informed. Given this, high scientific standards are probably the ultimate
guarantee of independence.
30
See Wilson v Bradlees of New England, Inc, 96 F3d 552 (1st Cir 1996).
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parison to warning standards, that an agency will be able to issue
a generic design safety standard that reflects product-specific riskutility concerns.
The one factor that cuts against the prediction of a higher rate of
preemption in failure to warn than in design cases is that of time lags.
Information standards should be less costly to revise than design
standards. When new risk information makes the original agency
standard obsolete, the agency standard loses its congruence with the
common law standard. Hence, in comparison to design standards,
information standards should be revised or at least be capable of
being revised more frequently in response to new risk information in
order to justify preemption.
This approach, in addition to being consistent with error cost
minimization, is emerging as explicit doctrine in the courts. I consider some of the cases consistent with this approach in the following
part.
C. Application to Cases
The model just developed provides a ready explanation for Lohr, as
well as the Supreme Court's later treatment of preemption of products liability claims in Geier, Sprietsma, and Bates. Recall that the
plaintiff's pacemaker in Lohr had been exempted from the FDA's premarket approval process because it was "substantially equivalent" to
a device that was on the market before 1976.
Under the theory presented here, state law defective design claims
should be preempted by the MDA in the case of Class III devices
that undergo the pre-market approval process. In contrast, the Class
III devices that meet the substantial equivalence test should not be
shielded from liability under preemption doctrine. The reason is that
the FDA's pre-market approval process involves a careful consideration of the risk and utility characteristics of the proposed medical
device. These are precisely the issues that would be examined by a
court under the risk-utility test that would be applied in a products
liability lawsuit. Put another way, the federal regulatory standard
and the tort law standard are congruent. Since the FDA has greater
expertise than a jury, and since the issue is one that does not require
any special local knowledge of jurors, error costs are minimized by
preempting design defect claims brought against products that have
undergone the FDA's pre-market approval process. The majority of
3
federal courts have found that the MDA preempts such claims. 1
31

The Seventh Circuit found that the MDA preempted such a claim in Mitchell v
Collagen Corp, 126 F3d 902 (7th Cir 1997); the Eighth Circuit in Martello v Ciba Vision
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In the case of a medical device that is approved under the MDA's
substantial equivalence test, these arguments for preemption do not
hold. The substantial equivalence test is not congruent to the tort
standard. It does not involve the same consideration of risks and
benefits as would be undertaken by a court hearing a design defect
claim. Since the underlying legal tests are not similar, preemption
would be inappropriate under this framework.
The Supreme Court's decision in Geier can be squared with this
framework. To be sure, the fact that it was a five to four decision
suggests that the Court may sometimes have a destabilizing rather
than clarifying effect on tort preemption doctrine. Still, the outcome,
a finding that the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208 preempts state law design defect claims for failure to install an airbag,
is entirely consistent with the vast majority of federal court decisions, and should be seen in this context as a continuation of settled
doctrine.
The key result of Geier is that it put more doctrinal distance
between current preemption law and the express preemption focus
of Cipollone.The Court rejected the defendant's effort to shield itself
from tort suits on the basis of Cipolloneand the words used in the preemption provision of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety
Act. The Court pointed to the existence of a "saving" clause-a boilerplate provision in federal regulatory statutes that says that compliance with the statute does not exempt anyone from liability under
common law-as a reason for refusing to find a legislative intent to
preempt the plaintiff's claim. The Court then went on to apply standard conflict analysis, and concluded that since the Department of
Transportation had considered the risk and utility issues that would
be analyzed in a common law design defect claim, a decision not to
preempt would permit state courts to reach conclusions that actually
conflict with the federal regulatory scheme.
The Court's description in Geier of the development of Standard 208 suggests that preemption is the appropriate result under
this paper's framework. Standard 208 appears to have been developed and modified over time independently by the Department of
Transportation. It did not result from the agency rubber stamping a
Corp, 42 F3d 1167 (8th Cir 1994); the Fifth Circuit in Martin v Medtronic, Inc, 254 F3d
573 (5th Cir 2001). The Sixth Circuit accepted the reasoning of these cases in Kemp v
Medtronic, Inc, 231 F3d 216 (6th Cir 2000). In Papike v Tambrands, Inc, 107 F3d 737
(9th Cir 1997), a case involving a Class II medical device (tampons), the Ninth Circuit
suggested acceptance of the same reasoning. See also Gilleon v Medtronic USA, Inc.,
2002 US Dist LEXIS 20154 (ND Cal Aug 28, 2002). The only federal appellate court to
explicitly reject this argument is the Eleventh Circuit in Goodlin v Medtronic, Inc,
167 F3d 1367 (1 th Cir 1999).
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privately-developed industry standard. To be sure, the auto industry
has influence within the agency. However, in the highly publicized
setting of auto safety regulation, reputation concerns provide a check
on the degree to which agency officials will work on behalf of the
industry.3 2 No high level agency official with an eye on his political
future would want to be viewed as having sacrificed public safety to
protect auto industry profits. In addition, the department's level of
expertise surpasses that of the typical jury. There are no special local
concerns that would justify a decentralized process in which juries
decide the appropriate level of safety features in car designs. Since the
agency appears to develop its rules independently and the jury has no
informational advantage, error costs are minimized by preempting
air bag law suits under Standard 208.
As I noted earlier, the conclusion of Geierseems to be contradicted
by that of Sprietsma, which rejected the preemption defense. To see
the contradiction, recall that Sprietsma held that the Coast Guard's
decision not to require propeller guards did not preempt a state law
defective design claim based on the absence of a propeller guard. The
Court argued in Sprietsma that a decision not to impose a uniform
propeller guard requirement should not preclude a trial court from
finding that a propeller guard would be desirable in the case of a particular boat design. The Court argued in Geier that a decision not to
impose a uniform airbag requirement should preclude a trial court
from finding that an airbag would be desirable in a particular car
design.
The conflict between Geier and Sprietsma is superficial and
largely dependent on how the decisions are described. Moreover, the
decisions can be reconciled under the framework of this paper. The
key difference is that a decision to require airbags in Geierwould be
tantamount to a uniform airbag requirement. After all, if an airbag
would be desirable on risk-utility grounds in the car driven by the
plaintiff in Geier (a 1987 Honda Accord), why would it not be desirable in every other car that has a manual or automatic safety belt
system-i.e., all other cars?
In a system designed to minimize error costs, there is no reasonable alternative to preemption in Geier. It may sound plausible at
first glance to argue, as did the dissenting Justices in Geier, that the
Department of Transportation's decision should be treated as a minimum that should not preclude an individual court from finding that
32

Consider the fact that two of the former department heads, William Coleman and
Elizabeth Dole, are famous political figures who would lose enormous investments
in reputational capital if they were seen as mere stooges for the auto industry during
their tenures as Transportation Secretary.
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a particular car design was defective because it failed to include an
airbag. But this approach leads to an unraveling of the regulatory
structure. If you find one car design defective because it fails to
include an airbag, there is nothing to prevent you finding that they
are all defective for the same reason. And given that the Department
of Transportation, an expert body, had already weighed the relevant
risk-utility factors, any different conclusion reached by a jury would
probably be erroneous.
The unraveling problem is not clearly suggested by the regulations
in Sprietsma. The Coast Guard's decision not to impose a uniform
propeller guard requirement was based on its conclusion that the
risk-utility factors were dependent on the particular boat design.
A propeller guard might be desirable for one particular design and
undesirable-say because it substantially reduced engine speed-for
another. Unraveling is not an issue if a finding that one particular
boat design is defective because it does not include a propeller guard
does not imply that all boats without propeller guards are defectively
33
designed.

In terms of the error-cost framework presented here, the different
conclusions in Geier and Sprietsma can be reconciled on the basis
of the similarity between the regulatory standard and the common
law standard. Because there were no special design-specific features
that would have made an airbag appropriate for only one car design,
the regulatory standard in Geierwas a uniform product standard that
applied to every car design. The Department had, in effect, considered the same risk-utility factors that would be examined by a trial
court in a design defect action based on the absence of an airbag. The
regulatory and the common law standards were congruent.
Spreitsma is not a case in which the regulatory and common law
standards were congruent. The Coast Guard had not issued a uniform
standard. It had only decided not to issue a uniform standard because
design variations made such a standard ineffective. The Coast Guard
removed itself from the propeller guard question, leaving it to boat
manufacturers and other regulatory sources to find optimal safety
features.
Bates is easily seen to be consistent with this paper's framework.
FIFRA sets out labeling requirements, and should therefore be viewed
as a regulatory standard governing the disclosure of information.
33
1n other words, Sprietsma is defensible only if the unraveling problem is not
serious in that case. In interpreting the Coast Guard as having concluded that it was
not, the Supreme Court rejected the position taken by several lower courts that had
looked at the propeller guard issue. See, for example, Davis v Brunswick Corp, 854 F
Supp 1574, 1580 (ND Ga 1994).
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Common law on failure to warn is congruent, in the sense of this
paper's model, to the FIFRA regulatory standard. However, design
defect claims are not congruent to the FIFRA regulatory standard.
The Court's conclusion that design defect claims are not preempted
while information-based claims are preempted, to the extent they are
not parallel with the regulatory standard, 34 would be predicted by the
error-cost model of this paper.
One federal appellate decision that clearly falls within this paper's
framework is Judge Boudin's opinion in Wilson v. Bradlees of New
England, Inc. The plaintiff Wilson brought suit against the defendants on failure to warn and negligence theories after her daughter
was severely burned when her sweatshirt caught fire. The defendants
argued that Wilson's tort claims were preempted by the Flammable
Fabrics Act. The court, after examining the history of the federal
flammability standard, concluded that it was an industry-developed
standard that had been adopted without independent testing or modification by the Consumer Product Safety Commission. In Judge Boudin's view, this was enough to decide the case. Citing Learned Hand's
TJ Hooper opinion for the proposition that industry standards should
not determine common law negligence standards, the court held that
Wilson's claims were not preempted.
The majority of federal court preemption decisions are consistent
with the analysis in Wilson and this paper's framework, 3 though this
is hard to see at first because most of them hew closely to analyzing
the text of the statute at issue. Wilson is one of the exceptional opinions in which a federal court looks under the layer of statutory text
and inquires into the function of preemption doctrine. The Restatement of the Law Third, Products Liability, captures the current state
of preemption doctrine not with its provision on the regulatory compliance defense, section 4(b), but with its comment to that provision.
After saying in 4(b) that regulatory compliance does not preclude
"a finding of product defect, '36 the Restatement notes in its comment to that provision that a regulatory compliance defense may
be applicable when the regulation "was promulgated recently, ...
the specific standard addresses the very issue of product design or
warning presented in the case before the court; and when the court is
confident that the deliberative process by which the safety standard
was established was full, fair, and thorough and reflected substan34
Where the information-based claim is parallel to the regulatory requirement, the
plaintiff's tort action is not preempted because it is essentially a negligence claim
based (failure to warn) on the breach of a statutory standard.
"See
Part IV (empirical section).
36
1Restatement (Third)of Torts: Products Liability § 4(b) (1998).
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tial expertise." 37 The Restatement Third would have come closer to
describing what federal courts are actually doing if it had inserted the
language from this comment into provision 4(b).
D. Failure to Warn
This framework's implications for failure-to-warn cases are straightforward. The common law standard governing failure to warn cases
is a negligence test that compares the risks that probably would be
avoided by a warning with the cost of a warning. If the federal regulatory agency that oversees product labeling examines the same issues
in determining whether a warning should be required, and no new
risks materialize after the federal standard is issued, then the federal
regulatory standard is congruent with the common law standard.
Congruence, under this framework, is a necessary condition for preemption of failure to warn claims.
Some statutes, notably the MDA and FIFRA, require a federal
agency to regulate product labeling in order to safeguard health. In
many of these cases the agency's standard is congruent with the common law standard.
For example, the FDA has the authority under the MDA to classify
products according to whether they pose slight (Class I), moderate
(Class II), or serious risk to human health (Class III). For products in
the serious risk category (Class III), the FDA examines the seller's
proposed product under its "pre-market approval process," which
requires the seller to submit a detailed application which is reviewed
by a panel of experts. 38 For the products in the moderate risk category
(Class II), the FDA has the authority to require warnings and product
specifications (e.g., performance standards, post-market monitoring) if it considers the health risks substantial3 -and courts have
interpreted this statutory grant of authority to mean that the agency
has the primary responsibility to determine the risks that need to be
40
revealed to the consumer and how those risks should be reported.
In view of the FDA's charge under the MDA-to protect the public
health by assuring that medical devices are safe and effective 4'-and
the comprehensiveness of the pre-market approval process, one
should expect the agency to require warnings for Class III devices
3"Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 4 cmt e (1998).
3
8See, for example, Stamps v Collagen Corp, 984 F2d 1416, 1419 (5th Cir 1993).
39
Id at 1418.
4
Id at 1421.
41
See, for example, Stewart v InternationalPlaytex, 672 F Supp 907, 909 (DSC
1987); Brooks v Howmedica Inc, 236 F3d 956, 965 (8th Cir 2001).
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in every instance in which it would be negligent not to require one
and perhaps in other instances as well. In addition, there are no local
concerns that would lead one to think that a jury would be able to
bring any special knowledge to the determination of an appropriate
warning. Given this, substituting the decision of a court over that of
the agency increases the likelihood of error. The same can be said of
Class II devices, though the likelihood of preemption should be lower
for them than for Class III devices since they are approved under a
less rigorous process.
In the cases of both the MDA and FIFRA, there are expert agencies
(FDA in the former, EPA in the latter) applying a standard that is
congruent with the common law standard to a problem of risk regulation that does not require the input of special local concerns. This
paper's framework predicts that courts should find state tort actions
for failure to warn preempted under these conditions, which is what
one finds (see appendix Table A2). The interesting question is why
some claims are not preempted.
One exception in which failure to warn claims are not preempted
even though the federal regulatory standard is congruent with the
common law standard is when the seller fails to comply with the
regulatory standard. 42 When the seller fails to comply with the regulatory standard, a decision against preemption is equivalent to holding the seller liable for failing to meet the regulatory standard.
The failure to warn cases also provide instances in which the federal regulatory standard does not appear to be congruent with the
common law standard. The model presented here predicts that the
preemption rate should be low, which appears to be true.
For example, consider failure to warn claims involving products
regulated by the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA). In reviewing proposed labels for drugs, the FDCA does not require the FDA to
apply the sort of rigorous review required under the MDA for Class
III medical devices. Indeed, the original purpose of review under the
FDCA was to prevent the "misbranding" of drugs, 43 not to establish
a uniform regime for determining the risks that must be conveyed to
consumers. FDCA regulations explicitly allow for sellers to modify
labels as new risk information comes to light.
Given the differences between the FDCA and MDA, the level of
congruence between the common law standard and the regulatory
standard is generally lower in the case of the FDCA. There is a wider
variance in regulatory standards under the FDCA than under the
42

Bates v Dow Agrosciences, 544 US 431 (2005); National Bank of Commerce v
Kimberly-Clark Corp, 38 F3d 988 (8th Cir 1994).
43
See Osburn v Anchor Laboratories,Inc, 825 F2d 908 (5th Cir 1987).
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MDA. Animal drugs, for example, are approved under a process in
which the agency takes a passive approach. Post approval monitoring
is less frequent than under the MDA. There is a higher likelihood in
this regime that a seller could negligently fail to modify a label to
reflect new risk information that comes to light after its product is
approved for marketing.
A general rule that approval of a product label under the FDCA
immediately implies preemption of tort claims would be inconsistent with this paper's framework. In fact, the rate of preemption
under the FDCA is low (see appendix Table A2). However, this can
be taken as no more than weak confirmation of the framework at
best. Many of the FDCA cases are decided on the basis of precedent
without much discussion of the underlying purpose of preemption
doctrine. The rate of preemption is too low, given that there are cases
(e.g., vaccines) in which the FDA's process under the FDCA is indistinguishable from its process under the MDA.
E. Failure to Comply with the Regulatory Standard Generally and
Fraud on the Agency
While failure to comply with the regulatory standard is often cited as
a potential reason for denying preemption (and for imposing liability
as well), the effect of an allegation that the defendant failed to comply
with the regulatory standard is mixed. A substantial number of products liability claims are preempted even though the plaintiff claims
that the defendant failed to comply with the regulatory standard.
This framework suggests a reason why a claim that the defendant
failed to comply with the regulatory standard does not generally lead
to a denial of preemption. The core of the explanation is the ease
with which a court can determine compliance with the regulatory
standard. If a court can determine failure to comply with the regulatory standard easily, then there is no great risk of error when a court
holds a defendant liable for failing to comply."
On the other hand, if the court cannot easily determine failure
to comply with the regulatory standard, there is a great risk of error
when a court denies a defendant's preemption claim. If the regulatory agency has not itself determined that the defendant breached its
standard, then permitting such a claim to be litigated would subject
the agency to second-guessing in court. Of course, it is a different
"The only reason a court would not hold a defendant liable is that the plaintiff's
claim has no counterpart in the common law. For example, if the common law says
clearly that the defendant owes no duty of care toward the plaintiff, the court should
not hold the defendant liable for a breach of a regulatory standard.
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case if the agency 45has determined that the plaintiff failed to comply
with its standard.
There is a special type of failure to comply known as "fraud on
the agency." In these cases, a plaintiff argues against preemption on
the ground that although the defendant complied with the agency's
regulatory standard, that standard itself was biased as a result of the
defendant's submission of fraudulent information. For example, a
plaintiff might urge, under this theory, that a court not find his claim
against a medical device seller preempted by the MDA when there is
evidence that the seller's product was approved for marketing on the
basis of false information given by the defendant to the FDA.
From an error-cost minimization perspective, there is a strong
argument against preempting a plaintiff's tort claim when the defendant supplied false information to the agency, the agency relied on
that information in setting its standard, and the resulting standard
was biased as a result. In this case there is no basis for believing that
the agency standard is more accurate than the court-determined standard. Moreover, finding preemption in this case encourages firms to
defraud regulatory agencies in order to gain immunity from effective
regulation and from tort suits.
The difficulty in applying this approach is that it leaves little of
the preemption rule intact. Every plaintiff who can find evidence to
support the claim that the defendant supplied false information to
the agency will assert it. If courts had to determine the validity of the
plaintiff's assertion in each case, there would be relatively little left
of the preemption rule. Instead of directly substituting the agency's
standard with the court's standard, this approach leads to an indirect
substitution that occurs through litigating over the existence and
effect of the defendant's alleged fraud.
While relying on a different rationale, the Supreme Court rejected
the "fraud on the agency" theory as an exception to preemption
4

SThis argument suggests that an alleged failure to comply is more likely, other
things being equal, to lead to a rejection of the preemption defense in the failure to
warn case than in the design defect case. Failure to comply with an agency's labeling
requirement is usually easy to determine. The court can read the agency's labeling
requirement just as well as anyone else, and can easily spot a failure to comply. However, this is not so often true of design defect claims. Regulatory design standards are
sometimes detailed and complicated, in other instances as vague as the common law
negligence standard. For a court to determine whether the defendant complied would
be equivalent in these cases to second guessing the agency's determination. In the
case of an expert, independent agency, this approach increases the likelihood of error.
This argument suggests that courts should be quicker to deny the preemption defense
in failure to warn cases because the risk of error is lower. There were too few cases
involving allegations of noncompliance and to perform a reliable test of this claim.
However, my sample provides some weak support for this hypothesis, see note 67.
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doctrine in Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Leg. Comm. 46 The majority
opinion noted that a fraud exception would distort the incentives of
product sellers who approach the FDA for approval, since they would
be aware that approval might not shield them from tort litigation for
failing to comply with the plaintiff's hypothetical version of the true
agency standard. Justice Stevens's concurring opinion in Buckman
argued that the plaintiff's claim should not be preempted in a case
in which the agency itself had determined that the seller had acted
fraudulently and had taken action to correct the regulatory error.
The position taken in the Stevens concurrence seems the most
consistent with the framework of this paper. If tort claims are limited
to those "fraud on the agency" cases in which the agency has actually determined that the seller acted fraudulently and taken action
to correct the fraud, then there is little risk that the fraud exception
will swallow a large part of the preemption rule. Under these conditions, only a small number of plaintiffs will be able to take advantage
of the fraud exception. In addition, given the risk that the sanctions
imposed by an agency may be insufficient to deter fraud, tort liability
provides reliable compliance incentives by internalizing the harms
caused by the seller's fraud.
While Buckman did not explicitly reject the existence of a fraud
exception in the case in which the agency itself has determined that
the seller acted fraudulently, its analysis, which is centered on the
argument that state tort law has little interest in protecting federal
agencies from fraud, leaves little room for it. The flaw in Buckman's
broad rejection of the fraud theory is that it encourages the very sellers who would attempt to defraud an agency to lobby the legislature
to weaken the agency's enforcement tools. If fraudulent sellers can
be sure that the sanctions for fraud will be limited to those imposed
by the federal regulatory agency, they will have incentives to seek
legislation and administrative orders that constrain agency sanctions
against fraud. The long run result could be an increase in fraudulent
applications. In short, there is nothing in the Buckman approach to
constrain the costs of political distortion, a factor that must always
be taken into account in the regulatory setting.
F. Summary of Implications
The implications of the error-cost model can be summarized as follows. First, the likelihood that a plaintiff's products liability claim
(design defect, failure to warn, or manufacturing defect) will be preempted increases with the degree of congruence between the agency's
'Buckman Co v Plaintiffs' Leg Comm, 531 US 341 (2001).
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standard and the common law. Second, the likelihood of preemption
increases with the perceived independence and rigor of the agency's
review process. Third, preemption is more likely in failure to warn
than in design defect claims. Fourth, preemption is unlikely in
manufacturing defect claims. Fifth, preemption is unlikely when the
defendant has failed to comply with the agency's standard .4 However, where there is a mere allegation of noncompliance preemption
may result because of the court's concern for the risk of error. Similarly, where there is an allegation of fraud on the agency, preemption
is likely to be the result given the risk of court error. I have argued
that the case law is consistent with these predictions. The remaining part of this paper looks for evidence to support these claims in a
regression model.
IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
A. Data and Model
To this point I have argued that the modern preemption case law is
consistent with an approach that seeks to minimize the costs of error.
In this part I will examine the empirical evidence that preemption
doctrine has always been consistent with this approach. This part
will try to identify the factors that are most important in explaining
the results of the preemption cases.
Table 1 provides a summary of the results from federal and state
products liability preemption cases, running from the 1970s to 2002.48
The table reports the number of cases and the number of claims,
since an individual case can involve more than one claim that a court
must decide whether to bar on the basis of preemption. Each case in
the table is either a trial or appellate court decision.
The sample described in Table 1 excludes United States Supreme
47

The sample of cases, discussed in the next section, includes no cases in which
there was a finding that the defendant failed to comply with the agency standard
(if such cases existed, they probably settled before trial). As a result, the fifth claim
cannot be tested directly. However, there are many cases involving allegations of noncompliance.
4
The first state case is from 1971, the first federal case is from 1976. Both federal
and state samples run up to 2002. To gather the cases, I performed identical searches
on Westlaw and Lexis using general search terms relating to preemption (e.g., "federal
preemption of state law claims"), using both "natural language" and "terms and connectors" searches. Within the extensive search results that came up, I ignored cases
relating only to ERISA. The cases that came from this initial search were shepardized,
and additional cases were added as a result. Finally, when reading cases, if a case was
cited that had not otherwise turned up in initial search stages, I added that case to the
sample.
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Table 1
Federal

State

TOTALS
Total # Cases
Total # Claims
Total # Preempted
Total # Not Preempted

200
255
156(61%)
99 (39%)

99
120
50 (42%)
70 (58%)

BY CLAIM TYPE
FAILURE TO WARN
Total # Claims
Preempted
Not Preempted

133
99(74%)
34(26%)

51
27(53%)
24(47%)

DESIGN DEFECT
Total # Claims
Preempted
Not Preempted

119
55 (46%)
64(54%)

67
23 (34%)
44 (66%)

3
2(67%)
1(33%)

2
0
2(100%)

MANUFACTURING DEFECT
Total # Claims
Preempted
Not Preempted

Court cases. The reason is that the Supreme Court operates with
fewer constraints than the lower courts. As the Cipollone experience illustrates, the Court has shown a willingness in the preemption area to strike off in a new direction, radically changing settled
doctrine. 49 Given this, the most accurate statistical picture of the
doctrine is provided by the bulk of cases meandering through the
lower courts. In any event, excluding U.S. Supreme Court products
liability preemption decisions reduces the sample by only five cases
for this period.
Table 1 shows that federal courts are considerably more likely to
find preemption than are state courts. Of the total claims, federal
courts found 61 percent preempted while state courts found 42 percent preempted. 0 For failure to warn claims, federal court preemp49

As another example of this willingness to deviate from settled law, consider
Geier, which was a 5-4 decision. Given that Geier is entirely consistent with prior
law, as reflected in the vast majority of appellate court decisions, it is surprising that
four justices voted against the majority's decision.
S0This difference is statistically significant at the ten percent level and almost significant at the more conventional five percent level. Under the hypothesis that federal
and state courts are equally likely to find a claim preempted, the preemption rate
should come to 55 percent in both systems (take the sum of 156 and 50, and divide by
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tion rate is 74 percent, while the state court preemption rate is 53
percent, which is statistically significant at the conventional five
percent level."1 For design defect claims, the federal and state court
preemption rates are 46 and 34 respectively. This difference is not
statistically significant.
Table 1 also shows that the preemption rate for failure to warn
claims is substantially larger than that for design defect. For example,
the overall preemption rate in the sample for failure to warn claims
in
in federal court is 74 percent, while that for design defect claims
2
federal court is 46 percent, a statistically significant difference.1
The high preemption rate for failure to warn cases confirms one
prediction of the "error cost" framework set out previously in this
paper. The model predicts that failure to warn cases should have a
relatively high preemption rate because it is easier for regulatory
agencies to issue a generic safety standard in the risk assessment
context. Risk assessment issues tend to be generic across a product
line-i.e., not varying by individual brand. Given their generic quality, warning standards will frequently be congruent with the test
applied by a court examining a failure to warn claim brought against
the manufacturer of a specific product. A higher degree of congruence
between the regulatory and court standards implies a higher rate of
preemption under the framework, which is confirmed in Table 1.
This is different from the case of design defects, which often vary
within a product line depending on the particular brand of the product (convertible car versus sport-utility vehicle), making it less likely
that the regulatory standard will be congruent with the common law
standard.
There are too few manufacturing defect claims to offer a useful
statistical comparison of preemption rates. Of the three manufacturing defect claims in the federal sample, two were preempted. Both of
the manufacturing defect claims in the state sample were preempted.
However, closer inspection reveals that even within this small sample,
the outcomes are consistent with the argument of the previous part
of this paper, which predicted a low preemption rate because of low
congruence levels. Both of the preempted federal claims were decided
2
the sum of 255 and 120). The chi-squared statistic is [(61 - 55)2 + (42 -55) ]/55 = 3.73,
significance
threshold
which, at one degree of freedom, is close to the five percent
of 3.84.
"The chi-squared statistic is [(74 - 68)2 + (53 - 68)2]/68 = 3.84, which, at one
degree of freedom, is (just) significant at the five percent level.
2
1 The chi-squared statistic is [(74 - 61 )2 + (46 - 61)21/61 = 6.46, which at one degree
of freedom is statistically significant at the one percent level.
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Table 2

FAILURE TO WARN
Federal:
Total # Claims
Preempted
Not Preempted
State:
Total # Claims
Preempted
Not Preempted
DESIGN DEFECT
Federal:
Total # Claims
Preempted
Not Preempted
State:
Total # Claims
Preempted
Not Preempted
MANUFACTURING DEFECT
Federal:
Total # Claims
Preempted:
Not Preempted
State:
Total # Claims
Preempted
Not Preempted

1972Cipollone
(6/24/92)

CipolloneLohr
(6/26/96)

Lohr2002

47
29(60%)
18(40%)

38
33(87%)
5 J13%)

48
37(77%)
11(23%)

13
10(77%)
3 (23%)

30
16(53%)
14(47%)

32
15 (47%)
17(53%)

45
19(42%)
26 (58%)

22
8(36%)
14(64%)

37
14(38%)
23 (62%)

8
1(12.5%)
7 (87.5%)

42
21(50%)
21(50%)
8
1(12.5%)
7(87.5%)

0
0
0
1
0
1(100%)

1
1(100%)
0

2
1(50%)
1(50%)
I
0
1(100%)

on special grounds unrelated to the degree of congruence between the
3
regulatory and common law standards.1
Table 2 shows the preemption outcomes broken down by claim
and by period. I divided the periods into pre-Cipollone,Cipollone to
Lohr, and post-Lohr. In the failure to warn cases, both federal and
state, one sees a sharp increase in the preemption rate in the Cipollone period, which remains high in the post-Lohr period as well. The
preemption rate for failure to warn claims in the federal case sample
3 One claim was preempted on the basis of a broad reading of Cippolone; the other
on the basis of a special provision for investigational devices in the MDA.
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jumped from 60 percent in the pre-Cipolloneperiod to 87 percent in
the Cipollone period, a statistically significant difference.14 In the
state courts, the preemption rate for failure to warn claims jumped
from 12.5 % to 77%. Over the Cipollone period many courts, following the Supreme Court's lead, found state products liability claims
preempted on the basis of a legislative intent inferred from words
used in federal regulatory statutes.
Table 2 suggests that Cipollone led to different results in the federal and state design defect cases. For design defect claims in federal
courts, the preemption rate is roughly the same in the pre-Cipollone
and Cipollone periods (50 percent and 47 percent respectively). In
the state cases, however, the preemption rate jumps from 12.5 percent pre-Cipolloneto 36 percent in the period between Cipolloneand
Lohr, which is statistically significant.5 The fact that the preemption
rate for design defect claims remained unchanged in the federal cases
after Cipollone is inconsistent with academic commentary at the
time predicting important consequences for preemption law in general. In the federal courts, Cipollone's immediate impact appears to
have been limited to the failure to warn cases. Of course, the sample
of state design defect cases may be too small to justify any confident
conclusions about the difference in Cipollone's impact on state and
federal courts.
Setting the sample size concern aside, what would explain Cipollone's apparently different effects on federal and state design defect
cases? The difference is probably attributable to the approaches to
preemption taken by federal and state courts. By the time of the
Cipollone decision, federal courts had already begun to develop a
body of preemption law governing design defect cases. State courts,
however, had for the most part adhered to a strong anti-preemption
preference as a rule of statutory interpretation. The Supreme Court
rejected the anti-preemption preference in Cipollone, which had a
much greater impact on state than on federal courts.
An alternative explanation for Cipplone'sdifferent effects on state
and federal preemption rates could be based on settlement activityor "selection effects." 5 6 No doubt settlement incentives are affecting
the sample preemption rates in both federal and state courts. But

s This difference is statistically significant at the five percent level. The chi-squared
(one degree of freedom) statistic for this difference is 5.
"The chi-squared statistic is 1(12.5 - 30)2 + (36 - 30)21/30 = 11.41, which, at one
degree of freedom, is statistically significant at the one percent level.
s6 See George Priest and Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation,
13 J Legal Stud 1 (1984); Keith N. Hylton, Asymmetric Information and the Selection
of Disputes for Litigation, 22 J Legal Stud 187 (1993).
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the selection effects story seems an unlikely explanation. To rely on
selection effects, one would have to believe that trial selection incentives differ in state and federal courts, which seems implausible.
Whatever the reason for the difference in Cipollone's impact in
state and federal courts, the state and federal preemption rates for
design defect claims converge in the post-Lohr period. The preemption rate for design defect claims in federal court is 43 percent in the
post-Lohr period, and the state preemption rate is 38 percent. This
difference is not statistically significant. While this seems to suggest
convergence of state and federal law on preemption of design defect
claims, the figures in Table 2 are insufficient to support such a conclusion. The regression analysis below will suggest that there has
been, at most, a weak convergence of state and federal preemption
law on design defect claims.5 7
B. Regression Analysis
1. Variables and Model
Recall that this framework points to two key factors as determinants
of the likelihood of preemption: agency independence and the level of
congruence between the agency's regulatory standard and the common law standard. In order to subject the model to a more rigorous
test I set up a Probit model for determining the probability of preemption for a particular claim. The model uses dummy variables for
the particular agency and statute to control for the agency's process
(e.g., agency independence, agency expertise). The model also uses
dummy variables that code for the level of congruence between the
agency's standard and the common law standard.
The congruence variable distinguishes four classes or types. Congruence Level One applies to all claims for which the agency's regulatory standard fails to impose any product-specific requirements that
govern the plaintiff's claim. The simplest example would be a regulation that merely classifies or identifies a product without imposing
any requirement on the seller whatsoever. 8 Another example is the
substantial equivalence test under the MDA, under which the FDA
approves a medical device for marketing as long as it is no more dangerous or less effective than an earlier comparable device.
7

The reader may ask why I have not also looked for evidence of convergence in the
failure to warn claims. There is no need because there is no suggestion in Table 2 that
the effects of Cipollone were different in the state and federal courts with respect to
the failure to warn claims. Cipollone caused a substantial jump in preemption rates
for both federal and state failure to warn claims.
" Ginochio v Surgikos, Inc, 864 F Supp 948 (ND Cal 1994).
1
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Congruence Level Two applies to all claims for which the agency's regulatory standard imposes only generic minimum product
standards. Several regulatory statutes are understood as setting out
generic minimum safety standards for products. For example, the
FAA (Federal Aviation Act), FBSA (Federal Boat Safety Act), CAA
(Clean Air Act), FDCA (Food Drug and Cosmetics Act) all fall in this
category.
Congruence Level Three applies to claims for which the agency's
regulatory standard imposes a menu of options. This applies to only
one statute and one agency: the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Safety Act (NTMVSA) and the Department of Transportation, respectively. In particular, Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS)
208 provided car manufacturers with the option to choose between
safety belts and air bag systems. The menu-of-options standard applies
to only the subset of NTMVSA cases involving FMVSS 208. There
are other cases, examining other safety standards imposed under the
NTMVSA that do not involve menu-of-options style standards.
Congruence Level Four applies to claims for which the agency's
regulatory standard exhibits the greatest degree of product specificity. These are claims for which the agency's regulatory standard
comes very close to, if not being identical with, the common law
standard governing the plaintiff's claim. For example, if the plaintiff's
claim is a design defect claim and the agency's standard requires it
to examine the risk and utility features of every product design, then
the claim would fall within the "congruence level four" category.
Design defect claims involving Class III medical devices-devices
that have been subjected to the FDA's rigorous pre-market approval
process-are generally in this category.
Table 3 provides definitions of the variables used in the regression analysis.5 9 The agencies and statutes are related, as shown in
the appendix Table A1 .6o Because of this, it was impossible to control
for all of the agencies and all of the statutes at the same time in
the regression analysis. For example, the fact that the Department
of Transportation implements safety regulations under five statutes
in this sample (Hazardous Materials Transportation Act (HMTA),
19The single equation Probit regressions are based on an assumption that the variables listed in Table 3 are exogenous. This seems defensible. For example, the claim
type variables (e.g., DESDEF, FAILWARN) are the clearest candidates for endogeneity.
But plaintiffs are likely to assert every plausible for nonfrivolous) theory of liability,
irrespective of the associated probability of preemption.
60One special case shown in the table is that of Section 211 of the Clean Air Act.
Although the Clean Air Act is administered by the EPA, I have linked Section 211 to
Congress. The reason is that the two CAA claims in the sample involve a question of
preemption under Section 211, not any particular agency rules or practices.
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Table 3. Variable Definitions
Variables
Dependent Variable:
PREEMPT

Independent Variables:
CONLEV1
CONLEV2
CONLEV3
CONLEV4
DESDEF
FAILWARN
MANDEF
COURTLEV
COMPLIED
FRAUD
PERIOD1 (PERIOD2, PERIOD3)

Definition

Dummy variable equaling one if claim is
preempted, zero otherwise
Dummy variable equaling one if claim is of
congruence level one (no specific requirement)
Dummy variable equaling one if claim is of
congruence level two (generic minimum
standard)
Dummy variable equaling one if claim is of
congruence level three (menu of options
standard)
Dummy variable equaling one if claim is of
congruence level four (highly specific
regulations)
Dummy variable equaling one if claim asserts
defective design theory
Dummy variable equaling one if claim asserts
failure to warn theory
Dummy variable equaling one if claim asserts
manufacturing defect theory
Dummy variable equaling one if deciding court
is an appellate court, zero if trial court
Dummy variable equaling one if defendant
complied with regulation, zero if allegation of
noncompliance
Dummy variable equaling one if plaintiff asserts
fraud on agency theory
Dummy variables coding for period of claim
(pre-Cipollone= period 1, post-Cipollone to
Lohr = period 2, post-Lohr = period 3)

Locomotive Inspection Act (LIA), Federal Boat Safety Act (FBSA),
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (NTMVSA), Federal
Aviation Act (FAA)) implies that it would be impossible (due to collinearity) to include in one regression dummy variables for all five
statutes and the agency as well.
2. Interpretation Issues
In the probit regressions below, I have assumed that the independent or explanatory variables have an impact consistent with the
theory set out in this paper on the probability that a claim is found
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preempted by a court. One difficulty with this approach is that we
observe preemption only within the sample of litigated cases. Since
the litigated cases are not a random sample of all of the disputes in
which preemption is an issue, the estimated relationship between
the likelihood of preemption and the independent variables may be
biased by litigants' decisions to settle or litigate.
To see this, suppose P is the probability that a claim is preempted.
The regression model assumes P is impacted by the independent
variables in Table 3. Suppose pli, is the probability that a litigated case
is preempted. While the basic theory leads to predictions on the relationship between P and the independent variables, we observe only
pFt. If the probability of settlement is Ps, the relationship between P
and P11 is P = (1 - P,P 1 1 or
plit __

P

PP

(I - P)

This implies that as long as the variables that are hypothesized to
influence P also influence the settlement probability Ps, any attempt
to estimate the marginal impact of one of the variables on the preemption likelihood may be biased by its impact on settlement.
The "sample selection" bias identified here is a general problem
that applies to any attempt to use court decisions in a regression analysis. The general way to control for this type of bias is to use information on settled cases, 61 but my sample is one of reported cases and
does not contain this information. One might think that the problem
could be avoided easily by not conducting an empirical investigation, but the problem is present even in analyses that simply discuss
reported cases.
Given the possibility of sample selection bias, the probit regression results below must be interpreted with care. The regression
estimates are reliable tests of the theory set out earlier in this paper
if the marginal impacts of the independent variables in Table 3 on
the settlement decision are negligible. On the other hand, one could
interpret the results as measuring the effects of the independent variables within the sample of litigated cases. 62 In this case the estimated
6"
See, for example, W. Kip Viscusi, The Determinantsof the Disposition of Product
Liability Claims and Compensationfor Bodily Injury, 15 J Legal Stud 321 (1986).
62
Even if the marginal impacts of the independent variables on settlement decisions
are not trivial, the results reported below still contain useful information concerning
the theory of this paper. If the results are consistent with the theory presented earlier,
they suggest that offsetting or countervailing settlement-bias effects are not so large
that they overwhelm the hypothesized effects of the independent variables.
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coefficients reflect a combination of direct effects on the preemption probability and effects on settlement, which is more difficult to
interpret. The discussion below adopts the former interpretation.
Again it is important to stress that the settlement bias problem
cannot be avoided in a sample that relies on reported court opinions.
Moreover, the problem exists whether one does an empirical analysis
or a less formal discussion of the case law. Given this, the regression
analysis below should be viewed as another way of discussing the
case law-a way that makes greater use of the sample and allows one
to make consistent comparisons within the sample.
C. Federal Court Sample
The first set of regression results are given in Table 4. The data are
from federal cases only. The results in Table 4 include controls only

Table 4.

Federal Court Sample Regression Results with Agency Effects

Variable
COURTLEV*
DESDEF* *

MANDEF *
CONLEV2* *
CONLEV3* *
CONLEV4**
PERIODI**
PERIOD3*
COMPLIED
FRAUD
FDA
CPSC
DOT
CONGRESS**
COAST-GUARD**

Marginal
Effect

Standard
Error

T Stat

Significance
level

.143

.082

-. 268

.108

.285
.552

.123
.099

2.31
5.58

.021
.000

.559
.754
-. 396
-. 237
-. 118
.132
.045
.033
.148
.352
.347

.062
.094
.113
.121
.105
.199
.108
.198
.169
.077
.060

9.06
8.01
-3.48
-1.96
-1.12
.66
.42
.17
.87
4.60
5.80

.000
.000
.000
.050
.263
.508
.673
.867
.382
.000
.000

1.74
-2.48

.083
.013

Probit using PREEMPT (claim preempted 1, not preempted = 0) as dependent variable, on federal sample and controlling for agency effects.
Number of observations = 243
Pseudo R2 = 0.43
Log Likelihood = -89.48
* statistically significant at the five percent level
statistically significant at the ten percent level
Note: Observations associated with dummies for FAA and HUD agencies were dropped
because of missing observations or lack variation in the sample.
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for the agencies, not for the statutes. Still, the regression model
viewed in its entirety performs relatively well, with an R-squared
statistic of 44 percent.
The only agency variables that are statistically significant in Table
4 are those for the Coast Guard, which implements regulations under
the Federal Boat Safety Act, and Congress, which is not an agency but
is the body that wrote the Federal Cigarette Labeling Act and Section 211 of the Clean Air Act. The agency variables should be understood as measuring impact relative to the Environmental Protection
Agency-the variable which was excluded from this regression in
order to avoid collinearity. Because this regression makes no attempt
to control for statute effects, the "Congress" coefficient should be
understood as reflecting the impact of the Federal Cigarette Labeling
and Advertising Act (FCLAA)-in other words, the two effects cannot be distinguished in this regression.
The positive and significant COASTGUARD effect provides some
support to this paper's claim that agency independence has played
an important role in preemption analysis. To be sure, this result reflects past experience, in which the Coast Guard's regulations under
the FBSA have been given preemptive effect by the vast majority of
courts. This is unlikely to remain after the Sprietsma decision. But
the Coast Guard effect appears to have been powerful, given that all
of the FBSA claims involved (and indeed were described by deciding courts as involving) only minimum safety standard regulations
(congruence level two).
The core of this paper's thesis is tested and validated by the results
for the congruence level variables. Those results show that the probability of preemption increases as one moves from congruence level
one (excluded from the regression) to congruence level four. Using
congruence level one (no binding regulations) as the base for comparison, the regression results show that the probability of preemption increases by .55 if the congruence level is changed from one
to two (minimum standards). The preemption probability increases
by roughly .56 if the congruence level is changed from one to three
(menu of options). The preemption probability increases by .75 if the
congruence level is changed from one to four (product specific regulations).
The variable DESDEF, which codes for whether the plaintiff's
claim is a defective design, has a negative and statistically significant coefficient of -. 268. This means that if you hold constant case
and court characteristics, a defective design claim is less likely to
be preempted than a failure to warn claim. This confirms one of the
predictions of the error-cost framework: that regulations governing
information provision to consumers are more likely to preempt state
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tort claims than are design regulations. The reason is that optimal
information-provision standards are more likely to be generic across
product type-e.g., a seat belt warning is unlikely to vary depending on the type of car. This, in turn, implies the degree of congruence between the common law standard and the regulatory standard
63
should be greater.
The result for the variable MANDEF, which codes for whether the
plaintiff asserts a manufacturing defect theory, is inconsistent with
the error cost model of this paper. The model predicts a negative
coefficient, because it is extremely costly for an agency to design
an enforceable regulatory standard governing manufacturing defects.
However, Table 4 reports a positive coefficient of .28. The result is
attributable to the small number of manufacturing defect claims in
the sample (three). As I noted earlier, two of the claims were preempted on special grounds unrelated to the degree of congruence
between the regulatory and common law standards.
The court level variable, COURTLEV, which distinguishes cases
decided by appellate courts, shows that the probability of preemption increases by a marginally significant .14 if the deciding court
is an appellate court (though this variable was insignificant in the
subsequent regression reported in Table 5). The positive result for
COURTLEV is to be expected, given that preemption is a question of
law, and the primary role of appellate courts is to ensure that lower
courts remain consistent with the law.
The remaining significant coefficients from the Table 4 are those
for PERIOD1, which codes for the pre-Cipollone time period, and
PERIOD3, which codes for post-Lohr time period. Both are negative,
indicating that the probability of preemption is lower in both periods
than in the Cipollone period. This result is consistent with the summary data reported in Table 2, which show the highest preemption
rates during the Cipollone period. The preemption rate has fallen after
the Cipollone period, but not to the level observed before Cipollone.
The key contribution of the PERIOD variables, above what was
conveyed by the summary data in Table 2, is to show that even after
6One might argue that congruence with the common law standard is insufficient by itself to explain the significant coefficient on DESDEF. Since the regression
already controls for degree of congruence, one might think that the coefficient for
DESDEF should be zero. However, the congruence variables code for different levels
of product specificity in regulations. A precise measure of congruence is unattainable.
Information standards differ from product-design standards in the sense that product
specificity may not be a necessary feature of an optimal information rule. The negative DESDEF coefficient (alternatively, the positive effect of a failure-to-warn claim
classification) may be capturing the effect of cases in which the optimal information
standard is generic rather than product specific.
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controlling for case and court characteristics, the Cipollone decision
appears to have had a big impact on preemption law. To be sure, much
of the impact was short-lived, since implied preemption theory has
overtaken express preemption theory as the dominant approach in
the federal courts today. However, the lasting effect of Cipollone was
to permanently reverse the presumption against preemption adopted
by many courts before Cipollone.
The insignificant coefficient for COMPLIED shows that an alleged
failure to comply with the agency's standard does not significantly
reduce the probability that the plaintiff's claim will be preempted.
This is consistent with this paper's framework. Recall that in order to
evaluate an alleged failure to comply in some defective-design cases,
a court would have to replicate the agency's regulatory process. The
weak impact of an allegation of failure to comply suggests that federal courts are reluctant to engage in second guessing the agency's
process-which avoids errors generated by having a less-expert court
review the actions of a more-expert agency. Federal courts are putting
a high evidentiary burden on plaintiffs who claim that the defendant
failed to comply with the agency's regulation.
Similarly, the statistically weak coefficient for FRAUD, which
codes for cases in which the plaintiff presents a fraud-on-the-agency
theory, indicates reluctance on the part of federal courts to second
guess agency processes. Indeed, the positive estimate for the FRAUD
variable suggests that courts may be more likely to preempt the
plaintiff's claim when he asserts a fraud-on-the-agency theory. This
is also consistent with this paper's framework. Fraud-on-the-agency
claims demand a serious incursion on the part of the court into the
agency's process. Courts sensitive to the error costs generated by
such an approach would be reluctant to accept these demands.
Table 5 reports results from a regression that controls for statute effects. 64 In this regression, the excluded statute is FIFRA, so
the results should be understood as capturing the statute's effect in
comparison to FIFRA. For the variables describing claim characteristics (e.g., type of claim and congruence level), the results are largely
the same as in the previous regression which controlled for agency
65
effects.
'The sample did not contain enough variation to control for both statute and
agency effects. Regressions that attempted to control for both came out poorly because
of collinearity.
6
SThe estimate for congruence level 3 is smaller than in Table 4, but this is probably
due to the presence of the NTMVSA dummy. The NTMVSA dummy codes for cases
that are largely congruence level 3 cases. An upper bound on the congruence level 3
effect can be estimated by taking the sum of the CONLEV3 and NTMVSA effects,
which is .668.

Keith N. Hylton
Table 5.

241

Federal Court Sample Regression Results with Statute Effects

Variable
COURTLEV
DESDEF*
MANDEF
CONLEV2**
CONLEV3**
CONLEV4 * *
PERIOD2* *
PERIOD3*
COMPLIED
FRAUD
MDA
FHSA*
NTMVSA
FBSA* *
CPSA
FDCA**
FCLAA* *

Marginal
Effect

Standard
Error

T Stat

Significance
level

.102
-. 271
.265
.553
.549
.760
.282
.141
-. 156
.119
.181
.309
.119
.332
-. 106
-. 419
.379

.089
.124
.118
.092
.064
.096
.087
.095
.107
.206
.102
.070
.198
.058
.290
.188
.062

1.14
-2.19
2.25
6.00
8.50
7.90
3.26
1.49
-1.45
.57
1.78
4.45
.60
5.67
-. 37
-2.22
6.08

.254
.029
.025
.000
.000
.000
.001
.137
.148
.566
.075
.000
.549
.000
.714
.026
.000

Probit using PREEMPT (claim preempted = 1, not preempted = 0) as dependent variable, on federal sample and controlling for statute effects.
Number of observations = 237
Pseudo R2 = 0.52

Log Likelihood = - 73.39

• statistically significant at the five percent level
statistically significant at the ten percent level
Note: Observations associated with dummies for FAA, LIA, NMHCSSA, HMTA, and
CAA statutes were dropped because of missing observations or lack of variation in

the sample.

The significant statute variables are those coding for the FCLAA
(Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act), FBSA (Federal Boat
Safety Act), FDCA (Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act), FHSA (Federal
Hazardous Substances Act), and MDA (Medical Devices Act). With
the exception of the FDCA variable, the variables for each of these
statutes entered with a positive coefficient, implying that they
increase the likelihood of preemption (relative to FIFRA) after controlling for claim type and characteristics.
The positive FCLAA coefficient suggests that the significant
"Congress" effect from the previous regression probably reflects the
impact of the FCLAA. This follows from the fact that the other set
of claims involving a regulatory standard set out in a federal statute,
Section 211 of the Clean Air Act, were held not to preempt state law
tort claims. The FCLAA is a special case of a specific product warn-
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ing adopted by Congress. Courts have routinely held that the warning adopted by Congress preempts failure to warn claims against
cigarette manufacturers after 1969.66 However, courts have also held
that the FCLAA does not preempt design defect claims against cigarette manufacturers.
The positive MDA (medical devices statute) coefficient suggests
that even after controlling for claim type and characteristics, the
medical devices statute has a relatively high rate of preemption. This
is due in part to the presence in the sample of cases involving the
Investigational Devices Exception to the MDA. Under this exception, which governs experimental devices such as new pacemaker
designs, courts have held claims preempted even though the FDA's
review process falls short of the type of examination that would be
carried out under a careful balancing of risk and utility. In particular,
the investigation devices exemption applies to product designs that
have not been put into practice.
More importantly, the negative and statistically significant FDCA
coefficient shows that the federal courts have been unusually reluctant to defer to the FDA's process under the FDCA. The FDCA coefficient implies that relative to FIFRA, claims under the FDCA are
less likely to be preempted by a probability differential of .42. This
supports the charge in Viscusi et al (1994) that courts have adopted
an unjustifiably low preemption rate with respect to drugs regulated
under the FDCA. However, this problem appears to be limited to the
FDA's process under the FDCA. No other statute effect in Table 5 has
a negative and significant coefficient. Moreover, the FDA's process
under the MDA appears to be treated with a great deal more respect
by federal courts than its process under the FDCA.
The weak positive coefficient for FDA in Table 4 shows that FDA
regulation by itself has no significant effect, either in increasing or
lowering, the likelihood of preemption. The coefficient estimates
in Table 5 for MDA and FDCA, however, show that the agency's
process under these statutes does have a significant impact on the
likelihood of preemption. Claims involving the FDCA are substantially less likely to be preempted than is the norm, while claims
involving the MDA are slightly more likely to be preempted. This
undercuts the claim by Viscusi et al (1994) that it would be socially
desirable to have a general regulatory compliance defense for products approved by the FDA and agencies with similarly rigorous
approval processes.
The FHSA (hazardous substances statute) effect is positive and
6 Cipollone,505 US at 530-31. The Cipollone Court also held that the 1965 FCLAA
did not preempt state law failure to warn claims. Id at 519-20.
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Table 5a. Predicted Preemption Rates by Congruence Level and Agency
MDA

FHSA

NTMVSA

FBSA

CPSA

FDCA

FIFRA

FCLAA

CONLEV1
CONLEV2

.010
.532*

.142
.909

.006
.451

.151
.915

.001
.221

.000
.056

.002
.315

.200*
.941

CONLEV3
CONLEV4

.985
.749*

.999
.973

.975"
.680

.999
.975

.907
.430

.694
.160

.946
.544

.999
.984

Notes: "-. denotes the "in sample" predicted values. The predicted values assume
DESDEF= 1,MANDEF=0, COMPLIED 1, COURTLEV= 1, PERIOD3 =1, PERIOD2=0,
FRAUD=0.

significant. This statute is administered by the Consumer Product
Safety Commission, which also administers the CPSA (product safety
statute). Again, the result shows that the agency's process rather than
the agency itself has the most important effect on preemption. The
FHSA is unique in its degree of specificity. The statute governs warnings on hazardous substances. It does not regulate product design.
Courts have generally held that it preempts failure to warn claims
and does not preempt design claims. Faced with such specific regulations governing warnings, courts have found it easy to preempt
failure-to-warn lawsuits.
Table 5A presents predicted preemption probabilities based on the
regression model used for Table 5. As expected, preemption probabilities increase with the congruence level, though there are exceptions. The high predicted preemption rates in the case of CONLEV3
reflect sample constraints: the CONLEV3 category of regulation is
observed only in the NTMVSA cases, which have very high preemption rates. In other words, the CONLEV3 and NTMVSA observations
are virtually the same. However, if in light of this one focuses on the
first, second, and fourth rows of Table 5A, the results show predicted
preemption rates increasing substantially with each move upward in
the congruence level variable.
The results in Table 5A address the calls for expansive regulatory
compliance defenses in Schwartz (2000) and Viscusi et al. (1994).
The high predicted preemption rates, some greater than 90 percent,
beginning at CONLEV2 and continuing to CONLEV4, undermine
the argument for a general regulatory compliance defense. The one
special case that supports Viscusi is the column of predicted preemption rates under the FDCA, which appear to be too low. Outside of
this special case, predicted preemption rates vary by case type in a
manner consistent with an effort on the part of courts to minimize
the expected costs of erroneous decisions.
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D. State Court Sample
Because the pool of preemption disputes in state courts is smaller
than that in federal courts, the sample of cases from state courts
is smaller than that from federal courts. This made it difficult to
control for agency and statute effects and at the same time avoid
collinearity. For this reason I dropped the dummy variables controlling for agencies and statutes in the state sample regressions. For the
same reason, I was forced to exclude the MANDEF variable and its
observations from the regressions.
The results of the simplest regression model for the state observations appear in Table 6. This regression makes no attempt to control
for agency and statute effects. Because of this, and because of the
smaller sample, the R-squared statistic, at 18 percent, is considerably
lower than those reported from the federal sample. In addition to the
sample differences, the lower R-squared may reflect a greater level of
inherent unpredictability in the state cases.
The most glaring results in Table 6 are the positive and highly significant period variables (PERIOD2 and PERIOD3). They show that
the effect of Cippolone in the state courts was much more dramatic
than in the federal courts. While Cippolone increased the probability
of preemption by roughly .20 in the federal courts (see Table 5), it
raised the probability of preemption by roughly .5 in the state courts.
The second noticeable difference between the state and federal
court results is that the variable COMPLIED, which indicates that
the plaintiff made no allegation of non-compliance by the defendant
with the agency's regulations, enters with a positive and marginally
significant coefficient. In other words, state courts are less likely to
preempt when the plaintiff alleges that the defendant failed to comply with the federal regulatory standard. This suggests that the state
courts are less deferential toward agency review processes than are
the federal courts.
Although the state courts are less deferential toward agency
review processes, they still behave in a manner consistent with this
paper's error-cost framework. One implication of the model is that
the effect of compliance on the probability of preemption should be
greater in the case of failure to warn claims than among other types of
claim. The reason is that it is easier to accurately assess compliance
in the typical failure to warn claim than in the typical design defect
claim. The model's prediction was confirmed in a later regression,
not reported in the table.6 7
The third and most important difference between the state and fed61In a separate regression I included interaction terms for COMPLIED, FAILWARN,
and DESDEF. They provided weak support for the model's implication that the effect
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State Court Sample Regression Results

Variable
COURTLEV
DESDEF* *
CONLEV2*
CONLEV3
CONLEV4
PERIOD2**
PERIOD3 *
COMPLIED*
FRAUD

Marginal
Effect

Standard
Error

T Stat

Significance
level

-. 124
-. 403
.408
.556
.165
.545
.501
.216
.020

.203
.123
.224
.177
.247
.154
.139
.131
.412

-. 61
-3.28
1.82
3.14
.67
3.53
3.61
1.64
.05

.541
.001
.069
.002
.503
.000
.000
.100
.960

Probit using PREEMPT (claim preempted = 1, not preempted = 0) as dependent variable, on state sample.
Number of observations = 118
Pseudo R2 = 0.18
Log Likelihood = - 66.37
• statistically significant at the five percent level
statistically significant at the ten percent level

eral sample is the weak result for congruence level four (CONLEV4).
State courts appear to be no more likely to find such claims preempted than they are for claims with the lowest congruence level,
which is a disturbing result if valid.
In order to examine more closely how the state courts have treated
cases of the highest congruence level, I ran a second regression
including interaction terms for CONLEV4 and the period variables.
The results are reported in Table 7. They reveal that the CONLEV4
effect has declined over the three periods within the state sample.
CONLEV4 has a greater positive impact on the likelihood of preemption than CONLEV2 in the first period (pre-Cippolone).The two
effects are roughly the same in the second period (after Cippolone
of compliance on the probability of preemption should be stronger in the case of failure
to warn claims. (The reason is that since the risk of error should be lower in failure
to warn cases, courts should be less concerned about the potential costs of denying the preemption defense.) The coefficient for the interaction of COMPLIED and
FAILWARN was 2.99 (t-statistic 1.35). The coefficient for the interaction of
COMPLIED and DESDEF was. 152 (t-statistic .58). A similar pattern was observed in
the federal sample. In a regression similar to that in Table 5, but including interaction
terms, the coefficient for the interaction of COMPLIED and FAILWARN was -. 158
(t-statistic -. 94) and that for COMPLIED and DESDEF was -. 346 (t-statistic - 1.47).
Of course, one reason why these results are so weak is that the plaintiffs' assertions of
noncompliance may be unsupported by any evidence in most cases. As I noted earlier,
any clear case of noncompliance would have settled out of court, so all of the cases in
which COMPLIED = 0 involve contested assertions of noncompliance.
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Table 7.

State Court Sample Regression Results with Period Interactions

Variable
COURTLEV
DESDEF* *
CONLEV2*
CONLEV3**
(CONLEV4) x
(PERIOD1)* (CONLEV4) x
(PERIOD2)(CONLEV4) x
(PERIOD3)
PERIOD2**
PERIOD3**
COMPLIED
FRAUD

Marginal
Effect

Standard
Error

T Stat

Significance
level

-. 075
-. 410
.454
.630

.201
.126
.221
.156

-. 37
-3.25
2.05
4.03

.708
.001
.040
.000

.554

.196

2.82

.005

.445

.263

1.69

.091

.050
.570
.658
.222
.014

.265
.195
.137
.131
.429

.19
2.93
4.80
1.71
.03

.851
.003
.000
.088
.973

Probit using PREEMPT (claim preempted = 1, not preempted = 0) as dependent variable, on state sample, and interacting congruence level four with period variables.
Number of observations = 118
Pseudo R2 = 0.20
Log Likelihood = -64.04
* statistically significant at the five percent level
statistically significant at the ten percent level

and before Lohr), and the CONLEV4 effect diminishes in the third
period (post-Lohr).
The declining effect of the highest congruence level is the result
of two evolutionary processes in the state courts. One, already discussed, is the effect of Cippolone, which made state courts more
likely to preempt cases of the second and third congruence levels.
This process probably explains the rough equality between the
effects of congruence level two and congruence level four in the second period. The second evolutionary process is the result of Lohr.
The weak estimated effect, in the post-Lohr period, of the highest
congruence level variable shows how state courts have responded
to Lohr. A substantial percentage of the state courts in this sample,
unlike the federal courts, read Lohr as imposing an exceptionally
high burden on defendants who claim that federal regulation should
6
have a preemptive effect .
The results of the empirical analysis of the state cases must be
interpreted with care, given the relatively small sample, and the con61 Many state courts in the sample appear to have adopted the approach of the Eleventh Circuit in Goodlin v Medtronic,Inc, 167 F3d 1367 (1 1th Cir 1999). In particular,
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sequent failure to control for agency and statute effects. Because of
these weaknesses, the state sample results do not shed light on the
importance of the perception of agency independence, or of respect for
the rigor of the review process required by the regulatory statute.
With these shortfalls in mind, one lesson suggested by the sample
of state cases is that state courts do not seem to be as sensitive to error
cost concerns as the federal courts. They are quicker to second-guess
the agency's process by refusing to preempt claims even when the
agency has adopted a rigorous process, and when the plaintiff alleges
that the defendant failed to comply with the agency's regulations.
These findings should not be taken as a rejection of the error cost
model, which is largely confirmed by the federal court sample. However, they do show that the model simply does not fit as well to the
sample of state court decisions.
The state sample results may reflect the redistributional bias found
in Tabarrok and Helland (1999).69 Tabarrok and Helland found that
state courts give higher awards when the defendant is an out-of-state
corporation, and that this redistributional tendency is enhanced in
states with elected judiciaries. Most of the products liability cases
in the state sample probably involve out-of-state corporate defendants. The greater reluctance in the states to preempt claims that
have undergone the most rigorous agency review processes, as well
as those in which the plaintiff alleges noncompliance with agency
standards, may reflect redistributional incentives.
V.

CONCLUSION

The literature and much of the case law on preemption continue to
focus on legislative intent as the primary theory of the preemption
decisions. Intent, as a theory, is proposed sometimes in the positive
sense, as a theory that explains the actual case outcomes, and sometimes in the normative sense, in the belief that a requirement of clear
legislative intent as a necessary condition for preemption would force
Congress to state its own preferences clearly. This paper has rejected
the following twelve states in the state court sample have at least one post-Lohr
decision rejecting preemption in a case involving the highest congruence level
(CONLEV4): Michigan (state appeals court), Missouri (Supreme Court), Illinois (Supreme Court), California (appeals court), New York (appeals court), Oregon (appeals
court), Kentucky (Supreme Court), Washington (appeals court), Texas (appeals court),
Montana (Supreme Court), Indiana (Supreme Court), Wisonsin (appeals court). Although not reported in the regression tables, I also ran a regression similar to that in
Table 7 on the federal sample. Unlike the results for the state sample, the effect of
CONLEV4 does not decline over time in the federal sample.
69Alexander Tabarrok and Eric Helland, Court Politics:The PoliticalEconomy of
Tort Awards, 42 J Law & Econ 157 (Apr 1999).
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the intent-based approach, as both futile and unnecessary. The preemption case law can be explained by objective factors.
Admittedly, legislative intent must play some role in preemption
analysis. If Congress preempted state tort lawsuits in absolutely
unambiguous language, that would presumably settle the matter.
However, the preemption provisions in federal statutes are almost
never stated in unambiguous language. The statutory language
almost always leaves courts with several degrees of freedom on the
preemption question. In view of this, some theory other than legislative intent is necessary to explain the actual case outcomes-or to
provide a normative theory of preemption.
This paper has offered an alternative to the intent-based theory of
preemption. The theory offered here envisions the preemption question as if it were a choice between two decision processes, federal
agencies and trial courts, both subject to error. The optimal preemption rule minimizes the costs of erroneous decisions to commit to the
agency process. I have argued that this approach favors preemption
when there is a high degree of congruence between the regulatory
and common law standards. The case law appears to be consistent
with this theory.
Appendix
Table Al.

Federal Agencies and Statutes

FDA
Food and Drug
Administration

MDA (Medical Devices Amendment)
FDCA (Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act)

Congress

FCLAA (Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act)
CAA, §211 (Clean Air Act)

HUD
(Housing and Urban
Development)

NMHCSSA (National Manufactured Home
Construction and Safety Standards Act)

DOT
(Department of
Transportation)

HMTA (Hazardous Materials Transportation Act)
LIA (Locomotive Inspection Act) (Fed. Railroad Admin.)
FBSA (Federal Boat Safety Act) (Coast Guard)
NTMVSA (National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act)
FAA (Federal Aviation Act) (Fed. Aviation Admin.)

CPSC
(Consumer Product
Safety Commission)

CPSA (Consumer Product Safety Act)
FHSA (Federal Hazardous Substances Act)

EPA
(Environmental
Protection Act)

FIFRA (Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act)
CAA
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Preemption Rates by Agency and by Statute (federal sample)
Design Defect Claims

Failure to Warn Claims

FDA
EPA
CPSC
FAA

39%
0
20
0

64%
78
71
0*

Statute
MDA
FCLAA
FDCA
FBSA
NTMVSA
FHSA
FIFRA

46
0*
20
91
67
0*
0

Agency

* based on 4 or fewer cases.

80
100
11
100
83
100"
77

